Wednesday, June 3, 2009

Cyber Security Czar

The White House continues to talk about creating a cyber security coordinator or cyber security czar. Comments from the administration talk about the threat of cyber attacks on our critical infrastructure and of cyber terrorism. My first response - FINALLY! Finally someone is taking the threat seriously. That said, I do not understand what a cyber security czar would actually do.

Many of the articles I have read on the subject talk about the administration's "plan to keep government and commercial information on the Internet safe from cyber criminals or terrorists." They talk about forming partnerships with state and local governments as well as with the private sector and about focusing on training and education. These are all good things but they won't really help make things more secure.

The only way for the federal government to make things more secure is to pass laws or set policy that everyone must comply with. Education won't do it because there are too many organizations that, as a result of ignorance, incompetence or arrogance, won't do the right things. That's why the government has put in place regulations like HIPAA, 21 CFR Part 11, GLBA and Sarbanes-Oxley. That's why the credit card companies put in place PCI DSS. The problem is that these measures just don't work. The minute you think you have created a checklist of minimum mandatory requirements, you have really created the only list of requirements that many organizations will follow. You have also given the bad guys a template of what your securty will look like. In effect, you have made security weaker.

Federal regulations and PCI have taken the wrong approach when it comes to cyber security. This is because they are trying to define the controls that need to be put in place. Unfortunately, information technology is too complex, companies are too diverse and the threat landscape is too dynamic for that to work. The minute you define a control requirement, bad guys find a way around it. The regulations then have to change but that process takes much too much time. Control focused regulatory requirements also create the impression that compliance equals security. That is simply not the case.

So, if the current regulatory requirements are the wrong approach, what is the right one? I'm glad you asked. The short answer is - responsibility. Organizations should be held responsible for the results of their security mesures, not on the measures themselves. If an organization has really bad security but never suffers a breach or compromise, is there a problem? If an organziation is 100% compliant with all regulations but they suffer a compromise that discloses credit card numbers and results in identity theft for thousands did being compliant help? The answers to these questions should be self evident. Unfortunatley, our current regulatory climate would praise the second organization while punishing the first. My thoughts are simple. Hold organizations accountable for effectively securing sensitive data - or more specifically, data that if modified, altered or destroyed, would negatively affect others. Many of the various state privacy laws to this. Let organziations secure their environments as the see fit but hold them accountable for failure. It doesn't take a cyber security czar or a Cybersecurity Act of 2009 to do this. It take a couple of things. First, it requires a national description of what "sensitive" data is. This list doesn't need to be that large but would include personal information that could be used for identity theft, personal medical records, personal financial records (including credit card data), classified government information and the like. Once this definition has been established, two things need to happen; a law needs to be passed that would result in penalties should these data be disclosed and a law needs to be passed (perhaps an expansion of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act) that makes it a crime to access these data without authorization.

What would the effect of this be? Of course I don't know for sure but here's my guess. Nothing would happen initially until the first few public cases of fines or other penalties levied against organizations who let their sensitive data be compromised were on the nightly news. This would serve as a wake up call (hopefully) making organizations approach security as a matter of risk management rather than as a checkbox that needs to be checked. Would it work? I don't know but I believe it would be better than what is happening today.

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